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Introduction 
America's 40th president, Ronald Wilson Reagan, died on June 5, at the age of 93. In the many 
commentaries that followed on Reagan's accomplishments and legacy, most gave a prominent 
place to some variant of the claim that Reagan "won the Cold War." A piece of the Berlin Wall on 
display at the Reagan Presidential Library symbolizes this historical interpretation. 
 
This summation also implies a view about how Reagan won the Cold War. It suggests Reagan's 
military buildup and moral frankness enabled the United States and its allies to defeat Soviet 
communism. The notion that military strength and moral clarity can pressure totalitarian regimes 
into collapse had become widely embraced as a lesson of the Reagan years even before the 
president's death. Such putative lessons of past experience are important because they can 
influence subsequent foreign policy deliberations. This appears to have been the case with some 
of President George W. Bush's foreign policy actions. President Bush's warning about an "axis of 
evil" in his 2002 State of the Union address, for example, clearly echoed Reagan's 1983 labeling 
of the Soviet Union as an "evil empire." 
 
Because widely believed lessons of history can affect foreign policy, it is important to assess 
interpretations of history carefully. If a popular account is inaccurate or incomplete, then applying 
the supposed lesson of that account could lead to unsound policy. What follows, therefore, is an 
attempt to summarize and assess the main arguments regarding Reagan's role in bringing about 
the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
 
The choice of wording to describe these events also has implications. The wording that the West 
"won" the Cold War accurately conveys the important fact that democracy was preserved while 
communism was discredited. If the Cold War had become a hot war, however, even if the West 
had still won it, such a war would have been indescribably destructive. In addition to the 
democracies being the winners, therefore, the fact the Cold War ended peacefully was also a 
major accomplishment. The Western democracies really sought two overriding objectives in the 
Cold War: preserving their freedom and avoiding World War III. The achievement of both 
objectives is what made the end of the Cold War such a cause for celebration. It is important to 
assess the Reagan legacy in relation to both these aspects of the end of the Cold War. 
 
Reagan's admirers do not claim that he alone was responsible for winning the Cold War, but they 
do tend to see his policy of "peace through strength” as the single most critical factor and his 
personal leadership as indispensable. Critics of this perspective often argue that Reagan made 
little difference because communism's internal weaknesses had become so pronounced that the 
Soviet Union would have collapsed no matter what. In this account, George Kennan's original 
vision of containment had come true, and Reagan was simply the lucky beneficiary of long-term 
trends that led the Soviet Union to implode.[1] Some analysts even believe Reagan's hard-line 
policies were counterproductive because they made it harder for Soviet General Secretary 
Mikhail Gorbachev to pursue his reform agenda.[2] My own conclusion is that Reagan was 
neither decisive nor irrelevant. Reagan contributed positively to the end of the Cold War, but his 
role was just one of several essential factors and his positive contributions were not always the 
result of taking a hard-line stance. 
 
To support this conclusion, the following analysis proceeds in three steps. First, I summarize the 
main features of the Reagan approach that have been credited with helping win the Cold War and 
discuss the degree to which each was likely to have contributed to that result. Second, I evaluate 
the conventional portrait of Reagan's overall approach in light of relevant findings from scholarly 
research on interstate interactions in general. Research on bargaining between adversaries 
suggests that highly coercive approaches, such as that attributed to Reagan, have important 
limitations. Because of this, I look more closely at how U.S. strategy actually unfolded during the 
1980s. As a result of this closer look, third, I identity, in addition to the initial tough approach of 
the Reagan administration, three other factors also helped bring about a peaceful end to the Cold 
War. These include popular campaigns against the nuclear arms race and for greater freedom in 
Eastern Europe, the coming to power of Gorbachev, and the tactical flexibility shown by Reagan 
and the first President Bush.  
 
The most important conclusion is that the United States did not actually stick to the purely 
coercive approach that is often associated with the Reagan administration. Instead, U.S. policy 
incorporated a mixture of firmness and reassurance. This combination of forceful and cooperative 
elements is what enabled the policy to succeed. 
Elements of the Reagan Approach 
Those who credit Reagan with defeating the Soviet Union emphasize two basic strands of his 
leadership: the clarity of Reagan's vision and language, and the pressure applied by his hawkish 
policies. Starting with the first strand, Reagan's policies appear distinct in part because of how he 
saw the world. To those who viewed the Cold War as not just a great-power competition but also 
a war of ideas, a president's ideas are part of the explanation for U.S. success or failure. 
Reagan's admirers believe he deserves credit for his clarity regarding three issues in particular: 
the weakness of the Soviet system, the moral failings of communism, and America's own 
potential.  
Perceiving Soviet Weakness 
Reagan stands out in part because he believed the Soviet Union could be defeated. For most of 
the Cold War, Republican and Democratic administrations alike had assumed the Soviet Union 
would prove durable for the foreseeable future. The bipartisan policy of containment aimed to 
keep the Soviet Union in check while trying to avoid nuclear war; it did not seek to force the 
dissolution of the Soviet empire. Ronald Reagan, in contrast, believed that the Soviet economy 
was so weak that increased pressure could bring the Soviet Union to the brink of failure. He 
therefore periodically expressed confidence that the forces of democracy "will leave Marxism-
Leninism on the ash heap of history." [3] Since one is more likely to strive to defeat an adversary 
if one believes that defeating it is feasible, Reagan's belief that communism was ready to crumble 
contributed to making his approach different from that of other presidents. This is one area in 
which his personal role stands out.  
 
The underlying weakness of an adversary, however, does not necessarily mean that increased 
pressure on them will produce the desired results. Short of imposing a military defeat and 
occupation, it is hard to place another country in a situation where it has no other option except to 
give up, especially when that country is a great power. Whenever a state's survival is threatened, 
a state may take extraordinary measures to preserve itself. There is usually more than one option 
available, so additional information is often needed to explain which option a state adopts in 
response to external pressure. It cannot be predicted that a hard-line approach will always lead to 
the collapse or surrender of an adversary.  
Expressing Strong Moral Judgments 
Political conservatives have tended to applaud the strong moral language Reagan used when 
discussing America's allies and adversaries. Reagan and the neo-conservative advisors who 
served in his administration disdained the tendency of Realist theory in international relations to 
describe all states as essentially alike in the pursuit of power and self-interest. They saw a vast 
moral difference between liberal democracy and communist dictatorship, and they thought it 
important that Western leaders should openly express their recognition of the evils perpetrated by 
communism. President Reagan thus broke with traditional diplomatic practice, which tended to 
eschew harsh rhetoric, by labeling the Soviet Union an "evil empire." 
 
It is quite difficult to assess the impact of language, but it is hard to imagine that being labeled evil 
made much difference to Soviet leaders. They tended to think in terms of power politics, so a 
challenge to their moral legitimacy would have been unlikely to weaken their self-confidence. It is 
possible, however, that Reagan's denunciations of communism gave encouragement to those 
citizens in Eastern Europe who were looking for an opportunity to throw off the yoke of communist 
government. It is unlikely this encouragement was necessary to spur their actions to dismantle 
communism at the end of the 1980s, but this boost to their morale might have added another 
increment to their resolve. Even if it did not matter to ending the Cold War, Reagan's clear stand 
generated goodwill toward the United States among the post-communist Eastern European 
regimes. As a result, they were more supportive of President George W. Bush's position on Iraq 
than many Western European governments. 
Restoring America's Confidence 
During Reagan's presidency, the national mood in the United States changed dramatically. 
Reagan sought to dissipate the feelings of despondence that had developed by the late 1970s 
and encourage greater optimism about the country's future. Quite apart from whether this had 
any impact on the Cold War, Reagan's positive outlook certainly lifted the spirits of many 
Americans. His contribution to renewing America's self-confidence is one of his most important 
legacies in the domestic arena. 
 
Some commentators have suggested that Reagan's impact on the national mood constituted a 
form of "moral rearmament" that increased the public's willingness to stand firm in the fight 
against communism.[4] This is a dubious assertion. Public support for a stronger stance against 
the Soviet Union increased most dramatically before Reagan's election, and then decreased 
during his presidency. Starting in 1976, opinion polls found more people supported increasing 
military spending than favored decreasing it, and by 1980, an absolute majority wanted to 
increase defense spending. Thus, support for a military buildup actually pre-dated Reagan 
coming to office. Once he occupied the White House, Reagan's policies and rhetoric divided 
public opinion and actually led to reduced support for a military buildup. In light of rising budget 
deficits and repeated revelations of inordinately high prices paid by the Pentagon for 
commonplace equipment, public opinion turned against the Reagan buildup. From 1983 to the 
end of Reagan's second term, more people favored cutting defense spending than favored 
increasing it.[5] In addition, the Reagan administration's initial rhetoric and policies regarding 
nuclear weapons frightened much of the U.S. public and helped spur a sizable grassroots 
movement on behalf of a nuclear freeze. Because of this active opposition to his policies, Reagan 
could not count on conveying to the Soviets that the United States would maintain unrelenting 
pressure on them over the long haul. Reagan's strong opinions concerning the Soviet Union's 
internal weakness and America's potential strength are one theme within accounts that credit him 
with winning the Cold War. These beliefs are given importance because they are seen as a 
necessary prelude to shifting the country to a more aggressive strategy in dealing with the Soviet 
Union. The other theme that appears in claims that Reagan won the Cold War concerns the 
effects of adopting a more competitive strategy. The basic idea is that by competing against the 
Soviet Union more vigorously in every area possible, the United States put more pressure on the 
Soviet system than it could withstand. The two key arenas of competition were the Third World 
and the arms race. 
The Reagan Doctrine 
The risk of nuclear war made both superpowers careful to avoid direct military clashes. Hence, 
the later decades of the Cold War were characterized by proxy struggles, in which each side 
aided clients in various internal and regional conflicts in the developing world. In the late 1970s, 
the Soviet Union became more assertive in Third World conflicts in the belief that the United 
States would be reluctant to intervene after its experience in Vietnam. In response, the Reagan 
administration announced it would confront Marxist forces wherever they were active in the Third 
World, a policy that became known as the Reagan Doctrine. 
 
These efforts proved most controversial in relation to conflicts in the Central American countries 
of El Salvador and Nicaragua. Because these countries were so small, neither state's choice 
about which side to align with in the Cold War would have altered the military balance of power. 
One could put forward other reasons for not wanting them to be ruled by Socialists, but the 
outcomes of their civil wars were not going to affect the stability of the Soviet bloc. In addition, the 
U.S. role in Central America clouded the moral clarity the Reagan administration tried to maintain 
with respect to the differences between the United States and the Soviet Union. At one point, 
President Reagan called the Nicaraguan Contras "the moral equivalent of our founding fathers." 
Although the Contras were a coalition, their leaders included former officials of the National 
Guard that had repressed opposition to the Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza. Comparing 
people who had opposed democracy and carried out significant human rights violations to  
America's founding fathers made Reagan appear morally obtuse rather than clear-sighted. 
 
The one country where applying the Reagan Doctrine had a significant Cold War payoff was 
Afghanistan. This was the only conflict in which the Soviet Union sent in its own military forces. 
U.S. aid to the mujahideen fighting against the Soviet invasion raised the costs of the Soviet 
occupation and may have accelerated the Soviet defeat. The Afghan debacle was in turn a 
catalytic experience that helped hasten the Soviet Union's collapse. 
 
However, two caveats must be added. First, in contrast to the controversies over U.S. 
involvement in Central America, there was bipartisan support for U.S. assistance to the Afghan 
resistance. Thus, it is not clear how much difference the Reagan presidency made; a Carter or 
Mondale administration would probably also have given support to the mujahideen, though 
possibly not as much. Second, we now know that U.S. efforts to mobilize opposition to the Soviet 
invasion had an enormous downside. The Arabs recruited to join the fight in Afghanistan included 
individuals like Osama bin Laden who would later organize al Qaeda. When the United States 
washed its hands of Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal, the Taliban eventually filled the 
power vacuum and offered a base of operations for al Qaeda. The subsequent al Qaeda terrorist 
attacks make it hard to judge whether, on balance, the U.S. assistance to anti-Soviet forces in 
Afghanistan did more good or harm to U.S. national security. 
 
Military Buildup 
Most of those who credit Reagan with ending the Cold War see the Reagan-era defense buildup 
as the single most important factor in bringing about this result. In the eyes of Reagan officials 
themselves, this had both an economic and a technological dimension. First, Reagan officials 
believed a rapid increase in U.S. military spending, including significant investments in nuclear 
weapons modernization, would pose an economic challenge to the Soviet Union. Because the 
Soviets started with a much smaller GNP, trying to match U.S. spending would create a greater 
strain on their economy than was the case for the United States. Second, Reagan's 1983 
decision to launch the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) played to America's advantage in high 
technology. Although many experts predicted that SDI would never work, Soviet awareness of 
America's lead in advanced technology made them insecure about their ability to compete in this 
area.[6] 
 
The Reagan-era defense buildup did contribute to ending the Cold War, but the causal 
connection is more indirect than described in the conventional wisdom. In other words, the impact 
of the Reagan buildup was not primarily a function of the strain it placed on the Soviet economy. 
The Soviet Union never increased its military spending to match the rate of the Reagan buildup 
and hence avoided exacerbating the defense burden on the Soviet economy.[7] Instead, the 
buildup and more assertive U.S. stance in general were most significant for how they affected 
Soviet thinking. Soviet strategic thought emphasized the concept of a "correlation of forces." This 
took into account the military balance of power, but instead of viewing it in static terms it 
emphasized dynamics in an effort to determine which side was favored by existing trends. In 
addition, the correlation of forces took into account political, economic, and other factors that 
might reveal the relative dynamism of competing social systems. During the 1970s, Soviet 
leaders were convinced that the correlation of forces favored socialism, and this made them 
willing to be more assertive in their foreign policy.[8] The Reagan era provided convincing proof 
that this rosy view of the correlation of forces was wrong. The various signs of renewed U.S. 
vigor, by discrediting the view that the correlation of forces favored the Soviet Union, helped open 
the door to alternative ways of thinking. This became important when Mikhail Gorbachev rose to 
the top position in the Soviet leadership. 
 
While the military buildup and other signs of toughness in the Reagan years helped create 
conditions that made a change of direction by the Soviet Union possible, they did not 
deterministically lead to only one possible end result. History is often contingent, with more than 
one outcome possible. This was true in U.S.-Soviet relations in the 1980s, as there is reason to 
believe that the Soviet Union might have responded to the Reagan challenge in a different way.  
 
In international relations, efforts to improve defense often involve a "security dilemma."[9] 
Increased military strength and a more assertive posture that are intended to bolster deterrence 
of an adversary can also appear to threaten the adversary's own security. By making the other 
side feel more insecure, defense buildups have the potential to provoke the other side into a 
counter-reaction, which can sometimes increase the danger to the first side. In fact, there are 
signs that the Soviet Union initially reacted to Reagan's defense policies in ways that increased 
the risks of inadvertent war.  
The Soviet War Scare 
Soviet sources have reported that in 1981, after Reagan had been in office for several months, 
the Soviet KGB became convinced that administration statements about seeking the ability "to 
prevail" in a nuclear war were serious. KGB Director Yuri Andropov, who the following year 
became Soviet General Secretary, told intelligence officers he believed the Reagan 
administration was planning a surprise nuclear attack on the Soviet Union; he therefore ordered 
an intelligence alert to monitor U.S. preparations. In fall 1983, this resulted in a major war scare in 
the Soviet Union, in which the KGB concluded the United States had placed its nuclear forces on 
alert and might be in the final stages of preparations for launching a first strike. If the Soviets had 
ordered what they believed to be a counter-alert and Western intelligence had detected Soviet 
preparations without knowing their cause, the two superpowers could have come to the brink of 
nuclear war. Fortunately, it appears that some KGB officers leaked information about the Soviet 
war scare to the British and U.S. governments, which then took steps to reassure the Soviet 
government that the United States was not planning a nuclear attack.[10] This incident suggests 
that Reagan's military buildup and harsh rhetoric had the potential to lead to a catastrophic 
outcome. Thereafter, things began to turn around, leading to the more favorable result we 
remember Reagan for today. To get from a nuclear war scare to the peaceful end of the Cold 
War, however, required both a moderation of the hard-line U.S. approach and a fortuitous 
development in the Soviet Union. 
The End of the Cold War in Light of Research on Bargaining Strategies 
There is a tendency to start with what Reagan initially said he set out to do and draw a straight 
line from these ideas to the subsequent collapse of the Soviet bloc. This leads to a conclusion 
that hard-line policies and forcefully stated moral judgments pressured the Soviet Union to self-
destruct. One way to evaluate this hypothesis is to compare it to general findings from research 
on states' strategic interactions. Evaluating the Reagan strategy in light of commonly observed 
patterns in interstate relations is hardly ever done, yet there is a considerable body of relevant 
research. Findings on the typical effectiveness of the strategies states have historically employed 
against potential adversaries are the most pertinent. This research suggests that a purely hard-
line strategy aimed at forcing the other state out of existence is unlikely to be successful.  
Perhaps the most relevant research concerns coercive diplomacy. Coercive diplomacy is a 
strategy that employs threats, especially military threats, to pressure a target state to change its 
behavior. Research on cases where states have attempted coercive diplomacy finds that the 
strategy fails much more often than it succeeds.[11]  
 
Coercion is especially unlikely to succeed when the other side would threaten its survival by 
giving in to the demands placed on it. The logic here is similar to situations of deterrence. In 
contrast to coercive diplomacy, which seeks to stop or change a course of action already 
underway, deterrence seeks to prevent an action from being initiated by threatening to impose 
costs on the target state if it takes that action. In many cases, the most powerful threat the 
deterrer can issue is the threat to eliminate the ruling regime in the other state. For this deterrent 
threat to work, the target state must have assurance that, as long as it does not take the action 
being deterred, it will not suffer the threatened punishment.[12] If the deterrer announces plans to 
try to change the regime in the other state whether or not it acts aggressively, then the other side 
has no incentive to be deterred. Without the assurance that the regime will be permitted to 
survive if it behaves itself, the target state might as well take a chance on obtaining the benefits of 
aggression. For the same reason, an expressed intent of forcing the other side's collapse 
undermines the chances that coercive diplomacy will lead to behavior modification. Without an 
assurance that a change in behavior will result in the lifting of the coercive pressure, why would 
any state give in? 
 
In contrast, coercive diplomacy is more likely to succeed when it is accompanied by positive 
incentives.[13] The net benefits of changing its behavior are made greater if, in addition to the 
lifting of coercive pressure, the target state can also obtain new, positive rewards. This also 
provides a degree of face saving for the other side, which can claim it accepted a bargain and did 
not simply cave in to outside pressure. Coercion is most likely to be effective, therefore, if it seeks 
to change the other side's behavior without seeking to cause the other side's collapse and it 
includes the promise of positive benefits if the other side becomes more cooperative. This is very 
different from the portrait that is often painted of the Reagan approach, and it raises doubt about 
whether his policies would have worked had they been purely coercive and tied to an unwavering 
objective of destroying the Soviet Union. 
Research on crisis bargaining leads to the same conclusion. Several studies have examined the 
different bargaining strategies states have used across a large number of crises and compared 
the outcomes. In general, strategies can be characterized as primarily coercive (or "bullying"), 
primarily conciliatory, or a relatively balanced mix of carrots and sticks. This last approach has 
been labeled both a "firm but fair" strategy and a "reciprocating" strategy: it seeks to demonstrate 
firmness while also signaling a willingness to cooperate if the other side behaves cooperatively. 
Historically, a firm-but-fair strategy has led to successful outcomes much more often than the 
other two. An overly conciliatory strategy runs the risks usually associated with appeasement by 
making it appear the other side can get away with pressing harder. An overly coercive strategy, in 
contrast, tends to convince the other side to dig in its heels and thus is most likely to lead to an 
escalatory spiral. A strategy that shows a state's resolve to defend itself while also credibly 
offering to reciprocate cooperation by the other side has the best chance to resolve a crisis 
peacefully without requiring the state to give up any of its vital interests.[14] Empirical 
generalizations based on a number of cases and supported by logical reasoning thus imply it is 
unlikely that the approach often ascribed to Reagan would have produced a peaceful end to the 
Cold War. 
 
This inference is supported by one other conclusion in the research on strategic interaction. The 
effectiveness of any strategy is also dependent on internal factors in the target state. The same 
strategy can produce different results depending on domestic political conditions and the 
character of the leadership on the other side. In particular, a forceful strategy can discredit hard-
liners when they are in power in the other state, but if this emphasis on strength is not adjusted 
after reformers come to power it can also undermine their attempts at moderation.[15] This again 
suggests an unchanging coercive approach would have been unlikely to foster Soviet reform. 
Because the Soviet Union retained sufficient autonomy to choose among different possible 
responses, if Soviet leaders had truly believed the United States was trying to destroy their 
regime, they might have chosen to return to greater internal repression in order to extract the 
resources necessary to respond in kind to the hard-line U.S. posture.  
 
The conclusion that emerges from a wide range of scholarly research on strategic interaction is 
that U.S. policy would have had the best chance for success if it mixed toughness with 
accommodative elements, especially if the United States elicited and responded positively to 
favorable internal developments in the Soviet Union. Ultimately, this is essentially what 
happened. Although Reagan has received the greatest attention for his efforts to increase the 
toughness of U.S. policy, it took the addition of three other factors to lead to the end of the Cold 
War. These other elements in ending the Cold War were grassroots activities in several countries, 
the coming to power of Mikhail Gorbachev, and the willingness of Presidents Reagan and George 
H.W. Bush to depart from the hard-line script. 
Other Factors in the End of the Cold War 
Peace and Human Rights Movements  
Several strands of action at the grassroots level also contributed to the winding down of the Cold 
War. One strand involved protest on behalf of peace and arms control; the other key strand 
involved the struggle for greater individual rights in Eastern Europe.[16]  
Peace Activism 
In response to the development of new nuclear weapon systems by both superpowers and 
statements by Reagan officials suggesting the United States could achieve the ability to win a 
nuclear war, massive protest movements arose in both Western Europe and the United States. 
These movements sought an end to what protesters saw as a dangerous upturn in the nuclear 
arms race. Reflecting this focus, in the United States the campaign emphasized the call for a 
bilateral "freeze" in nuclear weapons development. 
It may sound strange to give some credit for ending the Cold War to both Reagan and his most 
vociferous opponents, but there is good reason to do so. The peace movements of the 1980s did 
not succeed in getting their explicit policy demands adopted; for example, the United States never 
offered the nuclear freeze proposal to the Soviet Union. However, they did succeed in moderating 
Western policy. In response to the peace movement's success in appealing to public opinion, the 
Reagan administration made several tactical adjustments. It ceased all rhetoric suggesting the 
idea of a winnable nuclear war; instead, President Reagan began speaking regularly about his 
own concerns regarding the dangers of nuclear weapons. In addition, the United States entered 
new nuclear arms talks earlier than the Reagan administration had originally intended, and, after 
talks broke down in fall 1983, the administration worked to ensure talks would resume again as 
soon as possible.[17] 
 
These adjustments changed the face that U.S. policy turned toward the Soviet Union. They 
helped alleviate the nuclear war fears on the Soviet side discussed above. They also moved the 
overall U.S. approach closer to a strategy of reciprocity. The U.S. defense buildup continued, 
suggesting that the United States would still meet any Soviet efforts to expand their influence. But 
this reciprocity in relation to assertive behavior was now paired with signs of willingness to 
reciprocate Soviet cooperation as well. Because of the moderating impact of protest against the 
nuclear arms race, the U.S. bargaining stance came to more closely resemble a "firm-but-fair" 
strategy than the pure "peace through strength" approach often associated with Reagan. Based 
on the patterns observed in other historical cases, this should have improved the odds of 
success. 
 
There are also logical reasons for thinking this shift in a more moderate direction should have 
helped. If the United States had not credibly signaled that it would agree to equitable arms control 
deals, reform forces in the Soviet Union would have had to argue their case in the context of a 
more hostile international environment. It is possible that Soviet leaders would have hesitated to 
elevate a reformer like Gorbachev to the position of General Secretary if they believed the United 
States was interested only in forcing the Soviet Union out of business and would not be willing to 
negotiate any limits on nuclear arms. If Gorbachev had still become the new Soviet leader in 
1985, he would have found it harder to gain support in the Politburo for his reform ideas if the 
Soviet Union confronted what appeared to be an implacably hostile United States. Had Soviet 
leaders expected the United States would try to exploit any crack in the Soviet façade to engineer 
the Soviet Union's downfall, they would have had less confidence in the merits of suggesting 
summit meetings or new arms control proposals, they would have been less likely to make 
unilateral cuts in conventional forces, and they would have had to consider more carefully the 
risks before proceeding with domestic opening and economic restructuring.  
Campaigns for Human Rights  
Another, even more important strand of grassroots activity was centered in Eastern Europe. The 
Soviet bloc ultimately dissolved because people in Eastern Europe stopped acquiescing in being 
ruled by Communist regimes. The efforts of groups like Solidarity in Poland and Charter 77 in 
Czechoslovakia paved the way for the revolutions of 1989 that swept away the existing 
Communist rulers across Eastern Europe. The most decisive events in ending the Cold War, 
including the dismantling of the Berlin Wall, took place on the ground in Eastern Europe. The 
citizens of these countries who organized and participated in these events have the most 
obvious, direct links to the crumbling of the Soviet bloc, so their contribution to the end of the Cold 
War should not be underestimated. 
 
Gorbachev's response to these events was also critically important. In the past, most notably in 
Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Soviet Union had responded to stirrings of 
independence in its satellites with military intervention. In 1989, Gorbachev made it clear that the 
Soviet Union would not use its military to assist the Communist governments in these countries in 
suppressing the opposition movements. This decision had nothing to do, at least directly, with 
U.S. strength. Instead, it grew out of changing ideas about how the Soviet Union should seek its 
place in the world. President Reagan's policies and pronouncements may have contributed 
indirectly to the evolution in Soviet thinking, but this was not a case of the United States simply 
imposing its will on Gorbachev, nor was it the case that Gorbachev was persuaded to embrace 
Reagan's conservative views. In fact, many of the ideas and proposals embraced by Gorbachev 
had their origins in liberal-leaning Western NGOs and research institutes and were transmitted to 
the Soviet leader through transnational channels rather than through government-to-government 
communication.[18] 
 
There were also transnational links between Western European peace and human rights 
organizations and the opposition movements in Eastern Europe; certain church denominations 
with congregants in both West and East were also actively involved. These NGOs and church 
organizations gave various forms of practical help to their Eastern European counterparts. Protest 
against the nuclear arms race also played a role in Eastern Europe: by describing the nuclear 
policies of the two superpowers as a threat to Europe, both East and West, the dissident 
movements were able to gain additional support.[19] Opposition forces in Eastern Europe also 
got encouragement from President Reagan, including his famous call to Gorbachev to "tear down 
this wall," and they also benefited from ongoing support from the Polish-born Pope John Paul II. 
Here again, ironically, the synergistic interaction of conservative and liberal efforts on behalf of 
human rights probably had greater effectiveness than either strand would have on its own. 
In sum, grassroots activism in Eastern Europe, Western Europe, and the United States in support 
of arms control and human rights contributed in several ways to the peaceful end of the Cold 
War.  
New Soviet Leadership 
While political conservatives have tended to attribute the momentous changes of the 1980s to 
Ronald Reagan's leadership, many liberals have seen Mikhail Gorbachev as the individual leader 
who made the greatest difference. Gorbachev should not be seen as a solely decisive factor; for 
that matter, neither should Reagan nor the grassroots activism discussed in the previous section. 
However, the outcome of the Cold War cannot be explained without recognizing the impact of 
leadership change in the Soviet Union. 
 
It is easy to make a prima facie case for Gorbachev's importance because he was actually the 
fourth Soviet leader to serve while Reagan was in power. When Reagan took office, Leonid 
Brezhnev was at the Soviet helm. Brezhnev died in 1982, and was succeeded by Yuri Andropov 
and then Konstantin Chernenko before Gorbachev's ascension in 1985.  
 
Each of the four Soviet leaders had to deal with the Reagan administration, but they did not all do 
so in the same way. If the pressure applied by Reagan's policies was sufficient to force the Soviet 
Union to abandon the Cold War competition, then one should have seen signs of this under some 
of the General Secretaries who preceded Gorbachev. In practice, though, it was possible for 
Soviet leaders to choose different options in response to the Reagan challenge, and Soviet 
leaders before Gorbachev acted very differently than he did. As noted above, Brezhnev and 
Andropov perceived the Reagan administration as posing a military threat, and they reacted with 
harsh rhetoric of their own and also put the Soviet Union on a higher state of alert. Chernenko, 
already ill when he took over, acted as a caretaker, unwilling to make any major changes. Most 
Soviet experts believe the Soviet Union could have kept this up for some time; if they had tried to 
muddle through, making no major changes in their foreign policy or domestic economy and 
internally repressing dissent, the Soviet Union might have survived for at least a couple more 
decades.[20] Because the Soviet regime had more than one possible option, the path it took 
during Reagan's second term cannot be explained without taking into account Gorbachev's 
personal role. 
 
Gorbachev sought a relaxation of international tensions in the hope this would free up resources 
for economic reform. For this strategy to make sense, Gorbachev had to believe that a less 
aggressive Soviet posture would lead to a similar relaxation in the United States, which would 
make it possible to reduce Soviet military spending.[21] In making this calculation, it helped, as 
discussed in the previous section, that U.S. policy had already begun to moderate before 
Gorbachev came to power. Thus, not only did different Soviet leaders respond differently to 
Reagan, they were to some extent responding to different Reagan policies. The purest version of 
the hard-line "peace through strength" approach existed when Reagan first took office. It elicited, 
in tit-for-tat fashion, a largely hard-line response from the Soviets. The more forthcoming 
Gorbachev approach emerged only after U.S. policy had begun to evolve toward a firm-but-fair 
approach. If Reagan won the Cold War, he did not do it by sticking rigidly to the original script. 
The Flexibility of Reagan and Bush 
The final important factor in producing the peaceful end of the Cold War was the willingness of 
President Reagan and the first President Bush to move away from a purely coercive approach 
when changes began to occur in the Soviet bloc. Given what Reagan had consistently said about 
communism during his career and the image of firm determination he projected, it would not have 
surprised observers if, after Gorbachev came to power, Reagan had insisted that nothing 
fundamental had changed in the Soviet Union and stated that the dismantling of communism 
remained his objective. This is not what happened. Instead, as Reagan got to know Gorbachev, 
especially over a series of summit meetings, Reagan became more open to dealing with the new 
Soviet leader. 
 
The turning point in U.S.-Soviet relations came after an impromptu summit meeting in Reykjavik, 
Iceland, in October 1986. The Reykjavik summit itself collapsed because of deep disagreements 
about the U.S. SDI program. Before the summit collapsed, however, Reagan and Gorbachev had 
extensive, free-ranging discussions that revealed a common desire to seek the eventual 
elimination of all nuclear weapons. The summit made clear the outlines of possible agreements, 
including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty that was concluded the following 
year. 
 
If Reagan had continued to talk openly about leaving the Soviet Union on the ash heap of history, 
the Soviet government would have been unlikely to make unilateral cuts in its conventional forces 
or to negotiate agreements for deep cuts in its nuclear forces out of fear it was disarming itself in 
the face of an American threat. Gorbachev needed to trust that Reagan would exercise restraint 
while the Soviet Union struggled with its internal reform process.[22] As Reagan warmed to 
Gorbachev and their arms control talks, he actually came under criticism from conservative 
activists who had been among his strongest supporters. Shortly before Reagan signed the INF 
Treaty, one prominent conservative declared Reagan had turned into a "useful idiot" for the 
Soviet Union. This shows that true believers in hard-line anti-communism perceived at the time 
that Reagan's approach to the Soviet Union had changed.[23] Although Reagan did not make a 
180-degree turn—he stood firm on SDI and the need for strong verification of any arms control 
treaty—he did depart from his initial playbook, and this flexibility was important in enabling 
change in the Soviet Union. 
 
This willingness to pull back from the earlier coercive approach continued to prove important 
when George H.W. Bush took over the presidency. As the remarkable events in Eastern Europe 
unfolded during 1989, President Bush could have reacted to the growing cracks in the East 
European regimes by applying U.S. pressure in hopes of triggering the collapse of the Soviet 
bloc. Far from seeking to exploit the situation, however, the Bush administration instead took 
pains to reassure the Soviet government that the United States would not seek to take advantage 
of the turmoil in the Warsaw Pact countries. By largely staying quiet in public and reassuring 
Gorbachev about U.S. intentions in private, the Bush administration's deft approach made it 
possible for Gorbachev to allow the changes underway in Eastern Europe to continue.[24] 
With the revolutions in Eastern Europe, the Soviet empire collapsed, but the final stages in this 
process were only possible because the United States carefully avoided giving any appearance it 
was trying to force this result. The earlier show of firmness that peaked in the early 1980's helped 
convince Soviet leaders to re-think their policies, but the changes that finally ended the Cold War 
could only proceed when the United States made an equally convincing demonstration of its 
willingness to exercise restraint and cooperate on arms control. Presidents Reagan and Bush 
recognized the opportunities created by Gorbachev's rise to power and showed the flexibility to 
move U.S. policy onto a new track. Reagan helped end the Cold War in part by not sticking 
dogmatically to the hard-line approach so often associated with his presidency. 
Learning from Sharing Credit 
The Reagan era was a time of significant divisions in public opinion in the United States and 
Western Europe. Partisan disagreements in the United States are, if anything, even greater 
today. This partisanship tends to produce either/or debates. Those who regard Reagan as a great 
hero want to accord to him the lion's share of credit for ending the Cold War. Those on the other 
side want to discount Reagan's role and give credit instead to Gorbachev, or peace and human 
rights movements, or long-term trends in the communist bloc that would have caused severe 
problems for the Soviet government no matter what U.S. policy was. 
 
These claims are not logically incompatible however. Credit for ending the Cold War does not 
have to be an either/or choice. If one steps back from the heat of partisanship, it is possible to 
discern a sequence in which different strands of activity combined to produce the peaceful end of 
the Cold War and dismantling of communism in Europe. When historical events cannot be fully 
explained in terms of one person or one policy stand, then acknowledging the multiple factors 
involved helps safeguard against drawing an overly narrow or one-sided lesson from the case. 
Only by recognizing the need to share the credit for ending the Cold War can we hope to learn 
valid lessons. 
 
In the eyes of Reagan's staunch admirers, the West won the Cold War through a combination of 
military buildup, economic pressure, a tough and unyielding bargaining stance, and strongly 
expressed moral condemnations. These elements of the Reagan approach did contribute to the 
end of the Cold War. They increased the strain on the Soviet economy and, more importantly, 
gave Soviet leaders reason to re-think their views on the correlation of forces. If the United States 
had stuck exclusively to this approach, however, events would probably not have turned out as 
they did. The widely drawn lesson that military and economic pressure combined with moral 
frankness can cause totalitarian regimes to collapse is thus inaccurate.  
 
The main changes in the Soviet bloc came about only after U.S. policy combined firmness with 
moderation. The end of the Cold War thus corroborates the findings of numerous studies on 
interstate bargaining. In general, the most effective strategies combine sufficient toughness to 
deter mischief with sufficient restraint to convince the other side that the first side does not seek 
to dominate it or eliminate it. An effort to signal to the other side that aggressive behavior will be 
met with a vigorous response is more likely to produce behavior change if it also sends the signal 
that cooperative behavior will be reciprocated or rewarded. 
 
The initial signs of moderation in U.S. policy resulted from popular opposition to the Reagan 
administration's nuclear arms policies. By getting the administration to tone down its rhetoric 
about winning a nuclear war and to commit to arms control talks, grassroots protest helped create 
an environment in which it was easier for the Soviet Union to try out Gorbachev's reform agenda. 
Gorbachev's efforts to change Soviet grand strategy then really started the process of ending the 
Cold War. After that, President Reagan's ability to see that Gorbachev was different and to make 
tactical adjustments in his approach, rather than stick stubbornly to a purely hard-line strategy, 
made it possible to change the tenor of U.S.-Soviet relations. The dramatic final steps to end the 
political division of Europe then came about when the people of Eastern Europe acted to 
dismantle communism from below. History is usually written in terms of the world's leaders, and 
Reagan and Gorbachev deserve much of the credit they have been given. A full understanding of 
how the Cold War ended, however, shows that history is also made on the ground by many 
ordinary people whose names never make it into a history book.  
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